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Summary
Factors contributing to the effectiveness of prelaunch testing are examined 
from a systems viewpoint. The complexity of manned space vehicles increases the 
quantity of test data that must be evaluated before launch can take place.
The effect of these factors on prelaunch checkout is to place greater emphasis 
in the care of establishing: (1) accuracy and error budgets, (2) test techniques 
and equipment design, and (3) methods, plans and procedures for carrying out the 
prelaunch test program.
By defining checkout effectiveness in terms of probabilities of undetected 
failures and false alarms at time of launch, the constraints on the above categories 
can be shown in numerical terms. Interrelationships between test intervals, per­ 
centage of system tested, measurement accuracy, stimulus and measurement techniques, 
and procedures in use of the test system are developed.
Introduction
The assignment of high probabilities for spacecraft mission success is 
reflected in greater desired confidence levels of system operability at the start 
of the mission. With mission success goals running as high as .986 for a two-week 
lunar mission, the effect on prelaunch testing is to place more emphasis on the 
engineering that goes into establishing: (1) accuracy and error budgets, (2) test 
techniques and equipment design, and (3) methods, plans and procedures for carrying 
out the prelaunch test program.
Mission reliability profiles are developed on the basis of unity reliability 
at the beginning of the mission or time of launch. It is presumed that at the con­ 
clusion of the last test before launch all failures have been detected and repaired. 
Because each measurement has associated with it certain degrees of random error, 
there is a statistical probability that out of a population of n measurements, that 
one or more measurements will falsely indicate either an in-tolerance or out-of- 
tolerance condition. Thus an undetected failure or false alarm situation exists. 
The likelihood of such an occurrence increases as a function of the total number 
of test parameters that define an operable system, and also, as a function of the 
tolerance or limits on each parameter.
Because of the quantity and high order of accuracy of test parameters dictated 
by complex space systems, the probability of undetected failures is significant. 
This probability is magnified unless the quality of the evaluating device (checkout 
system) and the procedure for its use are carefully specified and controlled.
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This paper examines some significant factors related to prelaunch checkout 
effectiveness and establishes criteria by which checkout effectiveness may be 
defined. This criteria is further developed through the investigation of effec­ 
tiveness goals and how they may be allocated between subsystems and assemblies. 
A prelaunch checkout system design procedure for achieving specific goals is then 
presented by trading off total number of test parameters, accuracy of tests, number 
of tests performed, interval between tests, and percentage of system tested.
Finally, methods of implementation and control at the systems level for 
insuring that the recommended design procedure is carried out are discussed. 
Reference to test requirements, checkout equipment specifications and test pro­ 
cedures are made.
Systems Requirements 
Checkout Effectiveness
Checkout effectiveness may be defined as that accuracy or confidence by 
which it measures and predicts system operability. It may be expressed mathe­ 
matically as a function of various parameters that are related to testing tech­ 
niques and checkout system design. Its context as used in this paper is the 
probability of not making a checkout error while determining the existence of 
any failure or defect. For our purposes, a defect is defined as a system or an 
internal circuit parameter that is outside of specification limits because of 
failure or degradation. We are primarily interested in tolerance type failures 
as opposed to the presence or absences of discrete events such as observed when 
monitoring an open or closed switch or valve. The former category is significantly 
influenced by checkout accuracy whereas difficulty in testing for the latter con­ 
dition is more apt to be attributed to a checkout system failure and not to limi­ 
tations on accuracy.
Two types of checkout errors are possible: (1) failure to detect an existing 
defect, and (2) the detection of a failure that does not actually exist.
The first type of error is called an undetected defect and is treated here 
in the joint case, i.e., the probability of an undetected defect is equal to the 
probability that a failure or out-of-tolerance condition exist times the probability 
of not detecting it. The converse relation, the probability of no undetected defects, 
is related to the probability of mission success of the prime equipment in that 
the quantity of undetected defects at the conclusion of last test during pre­ 
launch degrades the initial point on the reliability curve to some value less 
than unity. This is assuming, of course, that all failures that are detected 
during prelaunch operations are repaired.
The second type of error, the detection of a defect that does not actually 
exist, is called a false alarm. Though it does not have a critical effect on 
mission success in the same manner as an undetected defect, it does contribute 
to needless delays, cost, and wear on the system. The most severe manifestations 
of this are lengthy launch pad delays.
A trade-off exists between these two error types. A reduction of one error 
type cannot always be achieved without the expense of increasing the probability 
of the other. This is shown in Figure 1 which summarizes the relationships of 
the various parameters that affect the two error type probabilities at the top 
of the tree. The arrows indicate direction of increasing or decreasing conditions. 
As an example, the probability of no undetected defects at the system level can
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Parameter Trade-Off
be increased by decreasing the number of individual parameters that define an 
operable system, or by increasing the number of checkouts, n, and percentage of 
system tested, x.
A basic math model which establishes the relationship among the first row of 
parameters of Figure 1 is presented as follows for P. ^, the probability of no 
undetected defects:
[
i n-1 _ ^ .> T 1 n v T ^Ti 1
(l-q)se-XT J P(o) + q ^ (l- q) se-XT j (1)
i=0
where: p( n ) = probability of no undetected defects present in the system
at the close of the n^^1 checkout 
g = probability of detecting all defects in the system during
checkout
s = probability of no defect occurrence during checkout 
X = system failure rate prior to activation for checkout 
T = time interval between checkouts 
n = number of checkouts 
P, v = initial condition — probability of no undetected defects
prior to next successive checkout
The derivation of this model and subsequent ones in this paper have been 
developed in previous work at RCA and is covered in detail by W. Moon in reference . 
What is significant in this model is that a quantitative value for checkout effec­ 
tiveness (as expressed by P/- \), can be computed for various values of the param­ 
eters on the first row of Figure 1. Additional models will also provide a quanti­ 
tative tie-in to individual measurement accuracy contained in the bottom blocks.
Using the above model, Figures 2 through 4 illustrate how the probability of 
no undetected defects, P, x, is affected by changes in (1) initial confidence in 
the system prior to checkout, (2) the time period between periodic checkouts, and 
(3) the percentage of total system tested.
Pre-Checkout Confidences
A plot of the probability of no undetected defects for a system that is 
periodically tested is shown in Figure 2. Each curve assumes a different initial 
confidence of system operation prior to the start of the first test while all 
other parameters are held constant. For each 0%, 50% and 90% initial probabil­ 
ities of no undetected defects, the curves exhibit an inherent system reliability 
decay between checkouts followed by an increase in the probability of no undetected 
defects at the close of each checkout. This increase is attributed to new knowledge 
gained from the checkout that there are no undetected defects. For this particular 
example, the values for g, s, X, and T were chosen more to illustrate the trend for 
periodic testing rather than as values being representative of any particular system. 
X, in this case, is associated with the standard reliability decay function and is 
shown as the slope between the peaks. In the case of shelf life between tests, 
this slope would be more nearly flat. (Any failure rate function could be used 
for that matter.) The vertical rise at each checkout assumes relatively negligible 
time to conduct the test and furthermore, that any failures or defects detected are 
repaired.
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Probability of No Undetected Defects For 
Varying Initial Test Confidence Levels
It can be seen that each curve exhibits an increase in the probability of 
no undetected defects for the first few checkouts. Complete confidence is not 
gained from any single test because the probability of detecting all defects, 
even in the tested portion of the system, is not unity. The significant point 
is that all curves converge to the same value regardless of the initial confi­ 
dence assumed prior to the first test. Ultimately after a given number of check­ 
outs, confidence is gained more from the individual checkout, and less on infor­ 
mation about the system from prior tests.
Periodic Checkout Intervals
The effect of time interval between tests is illustrated in Figure 3. Here 
intervals of 10 hours and 48 hours are chosen with the other parameters held con­ 
stant at the same values used in the previous example. The shorter time interval 
between checkouts results in a higher probability of no undetected defects. The 
reliability decay between tests in this case has less opportunity to develop, per­ 
mitting each test to maintain a higher confidence level.
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Probability of No Undetected Defects for Varying 
Time Intervals Between Checkouts
Trade-offs, however, exist between probability of no undetected defects and 
system failure rate. A reduction in interval between tests improves the former 
while the latter becomes worse. This is particularly noticeable in the deleter­ 
ious effects of system on and off operation every time a test is conducted. In 
general, checkout effectiveness is significantly improved by keeping the intervals 
short.
Percentage of System Tested
A checkout that covers only portions of a system results in lower test con­ 
fidences. In Figure 4, the curves represent the upper envelopes of the sawtooth 
functions in the previous examples with x being the percentage of system tested. 
This situation is typical of the testing environment on launch pads where accessi­ 
bility limits the amount of testing desired. With shrouds in place at vertical 
assembly, such equipment as radar antennas and stable platforms receive only 
cursory checks. The mission, effectively, for these systems has already started 
days prior when they received a last thorough checkout at an assembly area or 
bore s i ght r ange.
From the curve illustrated, untested portions of the system ultimately exhibit 
a decay in the probability of no undetected defects in spite of continued periodic 
testing. The continuous reliability decay of the untested portion eventually 
begins to dominate the course of the curve.
Individual Measurement Level
The three figures just discussed concern undetected defect and false alarm 
goals as related to periodic checkout and other criteria shown in the first row 
of parameters of the tree in Figure 1. To find the significant effects on pre- 
launch checkout detailed design, the interrelationship of the effectiveness goals 
must be considered further at the individual measurement level.
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The probability of detecting all defects, g, in a system during a single 
checkout is as follows:
(2)
where: m = number of individual parameter measurements per checkout
(p ) . = probability of an undetected defect for the i individual 
measurement
The probability of a false alarm, P, in the same manner, is defined as:
PFA - IT t1 - <Pfa>il (3)
where: (p~ ) . = probability of false alarm at the i h individual measurement
If we assume that the probabilities of undetected defects and false alarms 
(p d and Pf a ) are nearly the same among all individual measurements, then equations 
(2; and (3; become:
* = <l-P>n (4>
g may also be expressed as (l~ pTm)> where P™ is defined as the probability 
of undetected defects at system level for a single checkout. With effectiveness 
goals for PFA and PUD established as initial conditions, individual measurement levels for pud and pf may be obtained from:
P H = l-(l-P.m) (6) ud UD
and
Figures 5 and 6 are parametric plots of equations (4) and (5). Figure 5 
relates the probability of detecting all defects in a group of measurements to 
the number of measurements. The group, in this case, may constitute a complete 
system, subsystem, or even an assembly. The number of measurements are the minimum 
number of parameters which unambiguously define the operability of the system or 
subsystem. The three curves select different levels of probability of undetected 
defects at the measurement level. The effect on g, probability of detecting all 
defects, by increasing number of individual measurements, m, is clearly indicated. 
It is important to keep m small. The ideal situation is one where the complete 
operability of a system is defined by a single measurement. Complex systems involving large numbers of test parameters force higher levels of undetected defects. Sub­ 
sequent curves will show how compensation of this effect may be obtained through 
increased measurement accuracy and adjustment of decision limits.
The effect of false alarms for a group of measurements at the systems level 
versus the number of measurements is shown in Figure 6. As in the previous case, 
various values for false alarms at the individual measurement level are plotted 
parametrically using equation (5). Again, false alarm probability is a direct 
function of the number of measurements, m.
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Probability of No Undetected Defects Versus Total Number Of 
Measurements for Varying Undetected Defect Probabilities 
At Individual Measurement Level
Measurement Accuracy
The effect of measurement accuracy on effectiveness goals may be considered 
from the criteria that defines in or out-of-tolerance conditions. As was mentioned 
under Checkout Effectiveness, we are primarily interested in measurements which 
have tolerances and limits.
A typical checkout parameter would have upper and lower specification limits 
inside of which the actual or true value must fall in order to be acceptable. To 
minimize chances of error or an undetected defect, tighter decision limits may be 
established within the specification limits inside of which the measured value must 
fall in order to be acceptable. These bounds are defined by & and B in Figure 7.
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The probabilities of error are a combined function of the distribution of 
the true parameter value and the distribution of measurement error. The normal 
or Gaussian distribution for measurement error has been fairly firmly established 
in the measurement field. Distributions of the true parameter are not as easily 
determined due primarily to certain individualistic characteristics existent among 
some test parameters which lessens the validity for a single distribution that is 
applicable to all. However, for establishing goals for checkout design, the 
Gaussian distribution provides a good enough approximation and is used in this 
analysis. For the true parameter case, the nominal value is considered to be 
located midway between the specification limits SL and STJ . For a given checkout, 
the true parameter value is then distributed about the nominal in a normal or 
Gaussian manner.
Measurement error, on the other hand, is the difference between the true 
value of the parameter and what the measurement device says it is. The true 
value is then Gaussian distributed about the measured value, M. The combined 
distribution of both true parameter values about the nominal and true parameter 
value about the measured value, are contained in Figure 7. Back-to-back expo­ 
nentials were used to approximate the distribution to simplify solutions.
The definition of the probability of two error types, undetected defects and 
false alarms, is shown in Figure 7. The conditional probability of an. undetected 
defect is the probability that the true parameter value falls outside of the speci­ 
fication limits when the measured value falls inside of the decision limits. This 
probability is the shaded area contained under the small curve on the right. The
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conditional probability of false alarm is the probability that the true parameter 
value falls inside of the specification limits when the measured value falls out­ 
side of the decision limits. This condition is shown as the shaded area under the 
small curve on the left.
The mathematical relationships of Figure 7 for probabilities of undetected
defects, p ,, and false alarms, p , at the individual measurement level are as
follows: a ,„_ ^_ , „ / _ _ x""a
m
2 (a - a )v p m'
i" a m
2 % + CTm>
T a 2 Im
2 2 a -ap m
\uw K ^ ru>w /^ ^ /
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where: ^p* = standard deviation of density function for distribution of 
P true parameter, x.
<TjJj[ = standard deviation of density function for distribution of 
measured value, M.
and j& O' as defined in Figure 7.
The derivation of these functions is contained in reference^- and is beyond 
the scope of this paper to be presented here. However, an error in reference^ 
has been corrected in the second term of equation (9). The significance of 
these equations are their solutions presented parametrically in Figure 8. Here 
probability of false alarm versus probability of undetected defects are plotted 
for combinations of decision limits and measurement accuracy ratios. Checkout 
effectiveness goals for pud and pf derived from total system level using 
equations (6) and (7) can be entered and accuracy requirements for individual 
measurements determined. Accuracy is shown as the ratio of the standard devia­ 
tions. This is similar to the order of magnitude of measurement accuracy in 
percent over parameter tolerance. For the calculation of Figure 8, it was 
postulated that the parameter tolerance (specification limit) fell at the three 
sigma point for the true parameter value distribution. This is typical for 
current equipment specifications.
The solid curves, indicate that various combinations of prob­/ <y~",
abilities of undetected defect and false alarms can be obtained by shifting 
the decision limits while holding <T"jn/ cr~ constant. As p , decreases, pf 
can become quite large. On the other hand, for the region of relative flatness 
for tr~ / <np , a large shift in decision limits significantly changes undetected 
defects but has little affect on probability of false alarm. In the same region, 
accuracy change has little affect on undetected defects but does cause quite a 
change on false alarms. In general, this indicates that the manner in which the 
decision limits (/3 and 9) are changed to optimally reduce error situations is a 
function of where the area of interest lies. A reduction of probability of 
undetected defects without corresponding increase in false alarms cannot be 
undertaken without consideration in the selection of both accuracy as well as 
decision limit ratios.
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